Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu and Susilo proposed in 2015 an Identity Based Authenticated Key Exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication by means of their public identities. The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols called resiliency, that is, if a shared secret between a group of parties is compromised or leaked, they can generate another completely new shared secret without the need to set up a new key exchange session. They then proved that their IBAKE protocol satisfies this security notion.
INTRODUCTION
Key establishment protocols enable two or more entities to share a common key which can then be used for encrypting communications over an open network, or ensuring data integrity during the transport. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol [DH76] is the first practical solution to the key distribution problem. allowing two parties to establish a shared secret over an open channel. However, it suffers from man-in-the-middle attacks because it does not authenticate the involved parties. A key agreement protocol is said to provide key authentication if each entity involved in the exchange is assured that no other entity can learn the shared secret key. A key agreement protocol which provides such a property is called an authenticated key agreement protocol (AKE). There exist several techniques to distribute authenticated keys. Classically it requires public-key certificates with public key infrastructures. Another very interesting approach is to use public data like identities to generate authenticated keys.
The idea of using identities in cryptography dates back to Shamir's paper [Sha85] where he defined the notion of identity based encryption (IBE) where he asks how to achieve an asymmetric encryption scheme that allows to compute public keys from arbitrary strings like user's identity ( [Coc01] proposed ones in 2001. The Boneh-Franklin scheme [BF01] makes use of bilinear maps which then sparked a large number of works [BB04, Wat05] . More recently, lattices were considered for constructing IBE schemes [GPV08] which gave rise to a large number of follow-up works.
The approach proposed by Cocks in [Coc01] builds an elegant IBE scheme based on the standard quadratic residuosity (QR) problem modulo an RSA composite N (in the random oracle model). It is time-efficient compared with pairing-based IBE systems, but unfortunately ciphertexts are very long. Boneh, Gentry and Hamburg (BGH) solved the problem of Cocks' scheme by presenting a space-efficient scheme without pairings but at the cost of a less time-efficient scheme [BGH07] .
The concept of IBE was extended to authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. Smart [Sma01] presented a two-pass Identity-Based AKE (IBAKE) using Weil pairings and merging the ideas of Boneh and Franklin [BF01] with tripartite Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol of Joux [Jou04] . This work was then followed by several works. Recently, Elashry, Mu and Susilo [EMS15] proposed another IBAKE protocol and introduced a new security notion called resiliency. A key exchange protocol is said to be resilient if a shared secret between parties is compromised or leaked, they are still able to generate another completely new shared secret without the need to set up a new key exchange session between the participating entities. The IBAKE protocol proposed by [EMS15] builds upon the IBE encryption scheme of [BGH07] and is proved to be resilient.
1.1. Our contribution. In this paper, we analyze the security of Elashry, Mu and Sussilo (EMS) protocol [EMS15] and prove that it has a major security flaw which renders it insecure against an impersonation attack. We are indeed able to prove that the protocol is insecure against a very simple man-in-the-middle attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of the EMS scheme by proposing a very efficient attack where an adversary can compute any share secret key from the knowledge of a single secret bit. Our method is similar to the one given in [Ţ ITN16] to attack an IBE encryption scheme proposed in [JB09] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the definition and notion for IBAKE protocols. In Section 3, we present Elashry, Mu, Sussilo (EMS) IBAKE protocol [EMS15] . In Section 4, we describe our attacks against EMS protocol. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude the paper.
PRELIMINARIES

IBAKE Protocol.
As with all other identity-based schemes, we will always assume the existence of a trusted authority which is responsible for the creation and secure distribution of users' private keys. An Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange protocol (IBAKE) [Sma01, MB05] is defined by three algorithms Setup(), Extract() and KeyExchange().
(1) (msk, mpk) ← Setup(λ). The authority takes as input a security parameter λ and generates public parameters that are denoted by mpk and a master secret key msk.
(2) sk id ← Extract(msk, id). Given an identity id, the authority uses his master key msk to generate the private key sk id corresponding to id. (3) ssk ← KeyExchange(id 1 , id 2 ). Two parties P 1 and P 2 with system parameters (id 1 , sk id 1 ) and (id 2 , sk id 2 ) respectively generate a shared secret key ssk.
2.2. Quadratic Residues and Jacobi Symbol. For any integer N 2 we denote by Z × N the multiplicative group of integers modulo N. Let y ∈ Z × N then we say that y is a quadratic residue
The set of quadratic residues in Z × N is denoted by QR(N):
Let p be an odd prime number, we define the Legendre symbol of x ∈ Z with respect to p as:
We recall that x p belongs to {−1, 0, 1} and enables to determine if x is a quadratic residue since we have:
The Legendre symbol is extended to any odd positive integer N = p α 1 1 · · · p α k k where p 1 , . . . , p k are pairwise different prime numbers and α 1 , . . . , α k are positive integers. This generalization is called Jacobi symbol and is defined as:
The subset of Z N with symbol to equal 1 is denoted by J(N). Note that QR(N) is a subset of J(N).
The quadratic residuosity assumption states that, for any integer N = pq, where p and q are different prime numbers that are picked at random, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that is able to distinguish between the distribution of samples drawn from QR(N) and the distribution of samples picked from J(N) \ QR(N) (see [BGH07] for more details). where R and S are in Z N . They considered the following ternary quadratic form over Z:
Solving the equation
with R, S in Z. A classical result of Legendre [BGH07] says that (2) has a solution (x, y, z) ∈ Z 3 if there exist r and s in Z such that R = r 2 mod S and S = s 2 mod R.
(3)
Cremona and Rusin proposed in [CR03] an algorithm using lattice reduction to solve (2) assuming that (3) holds. Furthermore, if R = R mod N and S = S mod N then a solution to (2) also gives a solution to (1). Consequently, solving (1) consists in finding prime numbers R, S and integers r, s such that R = R mod N, S = S mod N and r, s satisfy (3). There exist several possible candidates ( R, S) from a given couple (R, S) but Boneh and Franklin proposed a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that finds a specific ( R, S) which leads to a solution to (1). For more details we refer the reader to [BGH07] .
Finally we state an important lemma that shows an important property that is used in [BGH07] and [EMS15] .
Lemma 1. Assume that R and S belong to QR(N) and let (x, y) be a solution to (1). Then we have the following equality:
Proof. We have in Z N the following equality:
The last equality is obtained by using (1).
ELASHRY-MU-SUSILO (EMS) IBAKE SCHEME
EMS scheme [EMS15] is specified by the following algorithms:
(1) (msk, mpk) ← Setup(λ). The authority takes as input a security parameter λ and generates two prime numbers p and q. It also selects an element µ ∈ J(N) \ QR(N) and a hash function H : {0, 1} * −→ J(N). The master public key is then mpk = {N, µ, H} where N = pq and the master secret key is msk = (p, q).
(2) sk id ← Extract(msk, id). Given an identity id, the authority generates R = H(id).
Since R is in J(N) then either R or µR belongs to QR(N). The authority chooses a in {0, 1} such that µ a R belongs to QR(N). It then picks at random one of the four possible square roots of µ a R. We denote it by √ µ a R. The private key for identity id is then sk id = (a, √ µ a R).
(3) ssk ← KeyExchange(id 1 , id 2 ). Party P 1 with identity id 1 and system parameter (R 1 = H(id 1 ), sk id 1 ) chooses two random values s 1 and α 1 in Z × N such that 1 µ α 1 R 1 ∈ QR. P 1 then sends (id 1 , µ α 1 , S 1 ) to P 2 where S 1 = s 2 1 mod N and keeps secret (α 1 , s 1 ). In the same manner, P 2 with identity id 2 and system parameter (R 2 = H(id 1 ), sk id 2 ) performs the same procedure: it chooses two random values s 2 and α 2 in Z × N such that µ α 2 R 2 ∈ QR.
Then P 2 sends (id 2 , µ α 2 , S 2 ) to P 1 with S 2 = s 2 2 mod N, and keeps secret (α 2 , s 2 ). Each party P 1 and P 2 computes separately T 1 = µ α 1 R 1 and T 2 = µ α 2 R 2 , and solves independently for each i = 1, . . . , ℓ the equation:
From the solution (x i , y i ) and its private key P 1 is then able to compute the quantity
1} from the solution (x i , y i ) and its private as the following:
By Lemma 1 we know that k i,1 = k i,2 and therefore the shared secret key ssk is equal to: ssk = k 1,1 , k 1,1 , . . . , k ℓ,1 = k 1,2 , k 1,2 , . . . , k ℓ,2 .
CRYPTANALYSIS
4.1. Impersonation Attack. The EMS protocol displays from its definition a major security flaw: it does not prevent from parties to be impersonated by an adversary. The protocols does not ensure any authentication during the exchange. In the following we explain a simple man-inthe-middle attack against the scheme. Let us assume that an adversary A receives and forwards data exchanged between P 1 and P 2 whose parameters are respectively (R 1 = H(id 1 ), sk id 1 ) and (R 2 = H(id 2 ), sk id 2 ). We will now show how A can easily impersonate P 1 . When P 1 sends its session identifier (id 1 , µ α 1 , S 1 ) to P 2 , A intercepts it and chooses randomly t and s in Z × N , computes S = s 2 mod N then sends to P 2 the quantity id 1 , t 2 R 1 , S . P 2 also sends its session identifier (id 2 , µ α 2 , S 2 ) that is intercepted by A. Upon receiving (id 1 , t 2 R 1 , S), P 2 1 P 1 can easily find α 1 ∈ Z such that µ α1 R 1 ∈ QR and can even compute √ µ α1 R 1 from its private key sk id 1 = (a 1 , √ µ a1 R 1 ). Indeed, P 1 chooses α 1 to be equal to 2t + a 1 for a random integer t ∈ Z so that
computes first T = t 2 R 1 R 1 mod N which turns out to be t 2 mod N. Therefore A and P 2 have both to solve for i = 1, . . . , ℓ the (common) equations:
Then A and P 2 share the same secret key ssk = (k 1 , . . . , k ℓ ) since for any i 1:
The main reason why this attack is possible comes from the fact that each party in the protocol perform computations without involving data that identify the correspondent. Hence EMS protocol does not satisfy the basic property of authentication that any AKE protocol must satisfy. In the next session, we analyze further the security of the protocol by showing that EMS does not even ensure the resiliency property [EMS15] .
Attack Against the Resiliency Property.
We assume that two parties P 1 and P 2 managed to share a secret key ssk = (k 1 , . . . , k ℓ ) by means of EMS protocol as described in Section 3. We will prove in the sequel that if an attacker A only knows one bit, let us say k i with i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, then he is able to recompute any bit k j with j = i. This proves that EMS protocol does not satisfy the resiliency property unlike what is claimed by the authors in [EMS15] . But before presenting our attack, we need an important lemma.
is a solution to Ax 2 + B 1 B 2 y 2 = 1 mod N where x 3 and y 3 are in Z × N and satisfy
x 3 = x 1 + x 2 1 + Ax 1 x 2 and y 3 = y 1 y 2 1 + Ax 1 x 2 .
We now describe how an adversary A can break the EMS protocol if A only knows k i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} from a shared key (k 1 , . . . , k ℓ ). For the sake of simplicity, we will only describe how A can recover k i+1 from k i and data publicly exchanged by P 1 and P 2 . By induction, the attack can be generalized to any bit k j .
Firstly, A solves (4) for i and i + 1 to get (x i , y i ) and (x i+1 , y i+1 ) such that:
As explained in Section 2.3, A gets the same solutions to these equations as P 1 and P 2 would have during the protocol. Furthermore, A knows (S 1 x i+1 , y i+1 ) which is a solution to the following equation:
From solutions (x i , y i ) and (S 1 x i+1 , y i+1 ), the adversary A, by using Lemma 2, derives (x * , y * ) that is solution to the equation
The next lemma proves that k i and k i+1 are related and an adversary can easily compute k i+1 from k i and y * and the public data exchanged between P 1 and P 2 .
Lemma 3. Let (x * , y * ) be the solution to (5). We then have the equality:
We start by observing that
Since k i = 
CONCLUSION
We presented in this paper a very efficient way to attack EMS protocol [EMS15] . Our work proves that unlike what is claimed by the authors, the protocol does not satisfy the so-called resiliency property. This security notion was introduced in [EMS15] to describe the property of AKE protocols that are still able to generate a new secret key even if some secret bits are leaked in the past. We show that EMS protocol is vulnerable to a simple man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, we propose an attack where an adversary is able to compute any bit of a shared key if he only knows one secret bit.
